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As a means of stimulating trade and mitigating the throes of a
depression several states enacted statutes legalizing contracts for the
maintenance of a specified resale price of an article in free and open
competition with other articles of the same general class. For enforce-
ment these statutes provide that "Willfully and knowingly advertising,
offering for sale or selling any commodity at less than the price stipu-
lated in any contract entered into .... whether the person so adver-
tising, offering for sale or selling is or is not a party to such agree-
ment, is unfair competition and is actionable at the suit of any person
damaged thereby.' 2 Attacked on constitutional grounds, these statutes
received the approval of the United States Supreme Court,
3 which
previously had declared resale price restriction, as a matter of gen-
eral law, contrary to public policy.'
whose negligence the master is attempted to be held liable, has not
been negligent, as was true in the case at hand, there should be no
judgment against the master." McGinnis v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co.,
et al., supra at 594.
1 Gen. Law of Calif. (Deering, 1931), Vol. 3, Act. 8782, amended
Calif. Stat. 1933, p. 793; Ill. Rev. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1935), c. 121%,
Sections 188, et seq.; Laws of New York (1935), c. 976, Sections 1, 2.
'Ky. Stat. (Carroll's 1937- Supp.), Section 4748i-1, et seq.
3 Old Dearborn Distributing Corp. v. Seagram Distilleries, 299
U. S. 183 (1936). Accord: The Pep Boys v. Py Wil Sales Co., 299
U. S. 198 (1936); Bourjois Sales v. Darfman, 273 N. Y. 167, 7 N. E.
(2d) 30 (1937). The United States Supreme Court found that the
state's exercise of the police power was reasonably necessary and
appropriately applied for the primary purpose of protecting trade
marks, and that there was no subtle attempt to fix prices [Tyson &
Bro. v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418 (1927)], or to delegate that power to Indi-
viduals [Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U. S. 137 (1912)]. "Here the restric-
tion already imposed with the knowledge of the appellants ran with
the acquisition and conditioned it."
' Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons, 220 U. S. 373 (1911); Bower
v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S. 1 (1913); Straus v. Victor Talking Machine
Co., 243 U. S. 490 (1917); Boston Store v. American Graphophone, 246
U. S. 8 (1918); Freh & Son v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U. S. 208
(1921); Federal Trade Commission v. Beechnut Packing Co., 257 U. S.
441 (1922). Contra: Ware & De Treville v. Motor Trade Assn., 3 K. B.
40 (1920), 19 A. L. R. 893 (1922). In the decisions of the United State8
Supreme Court it is not always clear whether the resale contracts
involved articles in free and open competition with other articles of
the same general class.
One may refuse to sell to those who persist in selling below a speci-
fied price. United States v. Colgate, 250 U. S. 300 (1919); State v.
Scollard, 126 Wash. 335, 218 Pac. 224 (1923).
After a manufacturer has sold an article he has no right to have
secret marks preserved on the enclosing cartons, which he placed
there to enable him to identify jobbers who refused to comply with
restrictions under which the goods were sold. B. V. D. Co. v. Isaac,
257 Fed. 709, 168 C. C. A. 659, (1919).
STUDENT NOTES
Proponents of such contracts argue that they avert the enormous
overhead expense of exclusive agencies
5 and extravagant advertising
by middlemen. The latter argument seems especially forceful today
when the manufacturer can appeal to the millions of people by nation-
wide radio programs. Competition can be concentrated among the
manufacturers and the public will come to rely upon their assertions
and demand the highest quality of merchandise. Moreover, the pro-
ponents argue that with respect to trade-marked merchandise the rea-
son for striking down restraints on alienation is inapplicable today
when huge department stores engage in the reprehensible practice of
palming off a "loss leader" to attract the public to buy other articles
from which a large profit comes. As much as a vendor is entitled to
make covenants to protect his adjoining land, the owner of a trade-
marked article ought to be entitled to insure its protection from public
obloquy that will come to it eventually because of its low resale price
and produce disruption of the industry.
The opponents denounce, as an obnoxious restraint on alienation,
any attempt of a manufacturer to control the resale of an article after
ie has passed title and received all that he intended to charge for the
article. With respect to the social and economic problems of resale
contracts, their opponents have found their strongest arguments in a
report of the Federal Trade Commission for the year ending June 30,
1918. The report stated that power to fix prices will usually be abused
by the allowance of too large profits. It protects and encourages inef-
ficient jobbers. It prevents elimination in the overcrowded field of
middlemen and tends to secure cooperation of dealers and to prejudice
them against brands whose prices are not fixed. It forces other dealers
to attempt the control of prices and encourages general standarization
of prices and the elimination of normal competition among dealers.
Finally, it forces the ultimate consumer to pay higher prices and leaves
him no bargaining power with respect to the article concerned.
In 1937 Congres enacted a statutes which, amending the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act, purports to delimit the extent of those United States
Supreme Court decisions deprecating resale contracts. Even with this
r Ford Motor Co. v. Boone, 244 Fed. 335, 156 C. C. A. 621, (1917);
United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U. S. 476 (1926); 27 Col. L.
Rev. 567 (1927).
015 U. S. C. A., section 1 (Pocket Part, 1938), 50 Stat. 693 (Aug.,
1937): . . . "Provided, That nothing herein contained shall render
illegal, contracts or agreements prescribing minimum prices for the
resale of a commodity which bears, or the label or container of which
bears, the trade-mark, brand, or name of the producer or distributor
of such commodity and which is in free and open competition with
commodities of the same general class produced or distributed by
others, when contracts or agreements of that description are lawful as
applied to intrastate transactions, under any statute law, or public
policy'now or hereafter in effect in any State, Territory, or the District
of Columbia in which such resale is to be made, or to which the com-
modity is to be transported for such resale, and the making of such
contracts or agreements shall not be an unfair method of competition
under Section 45, of this title, as amended and supplemented."
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amendment, federal courts may not enforce resale contracts void in
the.state where the articles are to be resold, notwithstanding the fact
the articles may have been a part of interstate commerce. Apparently
from the context of the amendment resale price maintenance contracts
concerning goods made in or transported into the District of Columbia
for the purpose of resale will be still invalid by virtue of the old
statute.
The common laws approving contracts between producers and
retailers for the maintenance of resale prices has been recently adopted
by a Kentucky Fair Trade Act.9
Also in 1936 the 'legislature enacted a fair trade statute.? The
first section, forbidding discrimination in prices between different com-
munities, is similar to a Missouri statue which was long ago held con-
stitutional."
A facsimile" of the sectionr disaproving any selling below "cost"
for the purpose of injuring a competitor and providing instructions
for ascertaining "cost" was recently declared unconstitutional1 ' by a
California Appellate Court because the prescription for ascertaining
"cost" was too indefinite and uncertain to meet the requirements of
due process of law.
After reflection, we think that in view of our complex economic
system, varying economic conditions and not misunderstood principles
of restraints on alienation ought to guide the courts in passing upon
resale price maintenance contracts. "Just as modern needs have
brought equitable restrictions on land, of which the old common law
knew nothing, into existence, they may also call for a limited departure
from the free transfer of chattels for the sake of promoting desirable
business practices wholly strange to Coke's day. . . . why should not
the doctrine of Tulk v. Moxhaej be extended to chattels."'1 Conse-
'115 U. S. C. A., section 3: "Every contract, combination in form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
in any Territory of the United States or the District of Columbia, or in
restraint of trade or commerce between any such Territory and
another, or between any such Territory or Territories and any State or
States or the District of Columbia, or with foreign nations, or between
the District of Columbia and any State or States or foreign nations, is
declared illegal ......
8 Commonwealth v. Grinstead, 111 Ky. 203, 63 S. W. 427 (1901).
SSupra, n. 2.
"OKy. Stat. (Carroll, 1936), Sections 4748h-1-4748h-14.
nCentral Lumber Co. v. State, 226 U. S. 157 (1912).
"Calif. Stat. (1935), p. 1548, section 3.
"3Ky. Stat. (Carroll, 1936), section 4748h-3.
14Balzer v. Caler, 74 P. (2d) 839 (1937).
I Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Ch. 774 (1848).
"Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 Hary. Law Re.
945, 983. At pages 988 and 989 he gives the arguments pro and con for
price restrictions. In conclusions on page 1013 he thinks that the need
for equitable servitudes on chattels through price restrictions is too
uncertain.
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quently, in view of the varying economic conditions in the divers parts
of the United States one must expect a conflict of authorities in the
absence of statutory declaration of policy. And even state legislatures
may favor different policies.
E. GAnLAND RAY.
THE STANDARD OF CARE IN CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE;
MANSLAUGHTER
It will be the purpose of this paper in general to define the standard
of care in criminal negligence cases resulting in manslaughter, and to
set up as a suggestion to the courts such a definition as will enable
them to discover, without wading through a sea of phrases and gen-
eralities, when the defendant is guilty of negligent ufianslaughter.
The writer will make no attempt to classify manslaughter cases
according to the instrumentality used. It is his belief that the main
test of criminal negligence is not the instrumentality, but rather the
state of mind of the actor. And thus the instrumentality is important
only as it furnishes evidence of this state of mind.
A few jurisdictions hold to the torts standard as the one for crim-
inal liability also.1 This, however, makes one liable criminally every
time he would be liable in tort, and ordinary negligence alone would
result in sentences of imprisonment or perhaps death. The writer
urges that this is too strict a standard for human beings who are
normally prone to make many mistakes negligently in their course of
life.
Most jurisdictions, as a result, realize that mere ordinary negli-
gence is not enough to sustain criminal liability.2 As Bishop puts it,
"there may be a degree of carelessness so inconsiderable as not to be
taken into account as criminal by the law."3 And one court said:
"Criminality can not be affirmed of every lawful act carelessly per-
formed .... The carelessness ... must be gross."' Again, in People v.
Barnes,5 the court said "to render the... (defendant) ... criminally
liable, his carelessness ... must be gross."
So one limiting part to our standard of care has been pointed out.
Mere ordinary negligence is not enough. To hold one liable criminally
for manslaughter as a result of negligence we must look for more than
'Missouri: State v. Emery, 78 Mo. 77 (1883); State v. Arm-
bruster, 228 Mo. 187, 63 S. W. (2d) 144 (1933). South Carolina:
State v. Gilliam, 66 S. C. 419, 45 S. E. 6 (1903); State v. McCalla,
101 S. C. 303, 85 S. E. 720 (1915); State v. Quick, 167 S. E. 191 (1932).
Texas: Haynes v. State, 88 Tex. Cr. Rep. 39, 47 S. W. (2d) 320 (1932).
Wisconsin: Clemens v. State, 176 Wis. 289, 185 N. W. 209 (1921);
Njeciek v. State, 178 Wis. 94, 189 N. W. 147 (1922).
'Clark and Marshall, Crimes (3rd ed., 1927), Sec. 264a.
11 Bishop, Criminal Law (9th ed., 1923), See. 216.
'Fitzgerald v. State, 112 Ala. 34, 20 So. 966 (1896).
'182 Mich. 179, 148 N. W. 400 (1914).
